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A SHOT IN THE DARK: WHY STRICT
SCRUTINY WOULD MISS THE MARK
FOR FELON-IN-POSSESSION
RESTRICTIONS
GABRIEL A. BLUMBERG*
ABSTRACT
In light of Judge Mannheimer’s lengthy dissent in Wilson v. State
regarding the 1994 amendment to article I, section 19 of the Alaska
Constitution, this Note takes an in-depth look at the history of that
amendment. The amendment clearly established an individual right
to bear arms for Alaska citizens, but Judge Mannheimer interpreted
it as also requiring courts to implement strict scrutiny when
reviewing the constitutionality of firearm prohibitions. This Note
thoroughly examines the legislative history of the amendment and
the 1994 election pamphlet to determine whether felon-in-possession
laws should be subjected to strict scrutiny review. While the
legislative history did leave the door open to a higher standard of
review for felon-in-possession statutes, the court of appeals firmly
shut that through its post-1994 rulings. This Note argues that the
court has correctly applied the legislative intent, and the principle of
stare decisis was correctly utilized in Wilson v. State to forego
application of strict scrutiny.

INTRODUCTION
In 1994, the voters of Alaska approved an amendment to article I,
section 19 of the Alaska Constitution.1 The amendment states: “The
individual right to keep and bear arms shall not be denied or infringed
by the State or a political subdivision of the State.”2 Over the next fifteen
* J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law (2011). B.S. Economics
and B.S. Psychology, University of Florida (2008).
1. See 1994 General Election Official Results, Statewide Summary, November 8,
1994, STATE OF ALASKA DIVISION OF ELECTIONS, http://www.elections.alaska.gov/
results/94GENR/result94.htm#bal 1 (last visited Feb. 19, 2011). The amendment
passed by a margin of 153,300 to 57,636. Id.
2. See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 19.
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years, three Alaska cases interpreted this amendment, and all three
reached the same conclusion: the amendment guarantees an individual
right to bear arms but still allows the legislature to promulgate firearm
restrictions for certain dangerous classes regardless of whether such
restrictions are narrowly tailored to meet a compelling government
interest.3 In 2009, the Alaska Court of Appeals addressed this issue for a
fourth time in Wilson v. State.4 This case marked the first opportunity for
the court to construe article I, section 19 since the United States Supreme
Court held in District of Columbia v. Heller5 that the Second Amendment
of the United States Constitution protects an individual right to bear
arms apart from any militia service.6
In Wilson, Allen Wilson was found in possession of a loaded
handgun after being pulled over for a traffic violation.7 Since he had
previously been convicted of a felony, Wilson was charged with
violating section 11.61.200(a)(1) of the Alaska Statutes.8 This provision
states that “[a] person commits the crime of misconduct involving
weapons in the third degree if the person . . . knowingly possesses a
firearm capable of being concealed on one’s person after having been
convicted of a felony.”9 At trial, Wilson asserted that this statute was
unconstitutional under the 1994 amendment to article I, section 19
because it did not distinguish between violent and non-violent prior
felonies.10 The trial court denied his motion to dismiss, and Wilson was
convicted.11
Wilson raised the same issue on appeal, and the court of appeals
disagreed with Wilson and affirmed the conviction.12 Chief Judge Coats
authored the opinion and relied heavily on the court’s prior decision in
Gibson v. State,13 which concluded that the legislative history and voter
intent of the 1994 amendment demonstrated that certain restrictions,
such as prohibiting felons and intoxicated citizens from possessing

3. See DeMars v. State, Nos. A-7002, 4100, 1999 WL 652444, at *2 (Alaska Ct.
App. Aug. 18, 1999); Morgan v. State, 943 P.2d 1208, 1212 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997);
Gibson v. State, 930 P.2d 1300, 1301–03 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
4. 207 P.3d 565 (Alaska Ct. App. 2009).
5. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
6. Id. at 595 (“There seems to us no doubt, on the basis of both text and
history, that the Second Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and
bear arms.”).
7. Wilson, 207 P.3d at 566.
8. Id.
9. ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.200(a)(1) (2010).
10. See Wilson, 207 P.3d at 566.
11. See id.
12. Id.
13. 930 P.2d 1300 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
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firearms, should not be invalidated by the amendment.14 He also
referenced District of Columbia v. Heller15 in order to demonstrate the
United States Supreme Court’s view that even though individuals have
a right to bear arms under the Second Amendment (which at the time of
Gibson had not yet been incorporated against the states16), the right is not
absolute with regard to convicted felons.17
Judge Stewart wrote a concurring opinion that supported Chief
Judge Coats’ conclusion by noting the value of common sense and stare
decisis.18 Judge Stewart appropriately interpreted the 1994 amendment
in light of the Alaska Supreme Court’s guidance regarding
constitutional interpretation. He announced that appellate courts should
apply independent judgment to questions of constitutional law and give
constitutional provisions “a reasonable and practical interpretation in
accordance with common sense.”19 Additionally, the proper review
requires that courts “look to the plain meaning and purpose of the
provision and the intent of the framers.”20 Judge Stewart immediately
applied these standards to decipher the intent of the voters because they
had been the ones ultimately responsible for approving the
amendment.21 Indeed, a key aspect of his analysis is its practical focus.
Judge Stewart pointed out that most citizens were likely not aware of
the standard of review that applied to firearm restrictions,22 nor that the
adoption of this amendment could implicate the standard.23 Neither the
election pamphlet nor the ballot made any reference to a standard of
review.24 Not even the neutral opinion of the Legislative Affairs Agency

14. See Wilson, 207 P.3d at 567–68.
15. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
16. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (holding
that the Second Amendment is fully applicable to the states). Interestingly, the
Court explicitly reaffirmed its statement in Heller that the holding should “not
cast doubt on such longstanding regulatory measures as ‘prohibitions on the
possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill.’” Id. at 3047 (quoting Heller,
554 U.S. at 626).
17. Wilson, 207 P.3d at 566–67; see also Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. Heller is a
federal case and thus is not a source of binding precedent for Alaska courts
interpreting the Alaska Constitution. The reference by Chief Judge Coats,
though, is beneficial for a broader perspective of the issue and as a general
justification for a state’s ability to place some limitations on the right to bear
arms.
18. Wilson, 207 P.3d at 569–70 (Stewart, J., concurring).
19. Id. at 569 (quoting Arco Alaska, Inc. v. State, 824 P.2d 708, 710 (Alaska
1992)).
20. Id. (quoting Arco Alaska, 824 P.2d at 710).
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See id. at 583–86 (Mannheimer, J., dissenting).
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made any mention of a potential change to it.25 Accordingly, Judge
Stewart came to the conclusion that the 1994 amendment did not require
the court to use strict scrutiny review in felon-in-possession cases.26
In response to the majority’s short and seemingly straightforward
decision, Judge Mannheimer penned a twenty-four-page dissent
thoroughly analyzing the legislative history of the 1994 amendment. He
passionately and persuasively argued that the Legislature intended to
apply strict scrutiny to firearm regulations. This Note aims to
demonstrate that the only aspect of the resolution that is binding on the
courts is its adoption of an individual right to bear arms. The committee
meetings are replete with legislators stating that the purpose of the
amendment is to guarantee an individual right to bear arms.27 Similarly,
the plain meaning of the amendment demonstrates an intent to clarify
that article I, section 19 grants an individual right rather than a collective
right. The legislature specifically began the amendment with the phrase
“[t]he individual right.”
In light of Judge Mannheimer’s forceful dissent regarding the need
for strict scrutiny, this Note will evaluate the court’s current approach to
the level of review for firearm cases.28 It will argue that the court in
Gibson opened the door to implementing a heightened standard of
review for felon-in-possession laws because of its unique opportunity to
analyze them in connection with privacy claims under article I, section

25. See id. at 583.
26. See id. at 569 (Steward, J., concurring).
27. See, e.g., MINUTES OF THE S. STATE AFFAIRS COMM., Jan. 21, 1994, 18th Leg.,
Tape 94-3, Side A at no. 142, available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/
get_single_minute.asp?house=S&session=18&comm=STA&date=19940121&tim
e=0905 (statement of Chairman Leman).
28. The Author agrees with Judge Mannheimer that the Legislature cannot
make conclusive findings on whether a law passes constitutional muster. See
Wilson, 207 P.3d at 590 (Mannheimer, J., dissenting) (“The courts are not bound
by either legislators’ or voters’ predictions of how an amended constitutional
provision will be interpreted and applied—unless that ‘prediction’ is actually
codified in the amendment itself.”). However, the Author also notes that the
Legislature cannot unilaterally establish the level of scrutiny for the court to use.
In Alaska, the supreme court applies its own “independent judgment to
questions of constitutional law and review[s] de novo the construction of the
Alaska and federal Constitutions.” Alaskans for a Common Language v. Kritz,
170 P.3d 183, 189 (Alaska 2007); see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803)
(establishing the process of judicial review); David L. Faigman, Amicus Brief of
Constitutional Law Professors David L. Faigman and Ashutosh A. Bhagwat, et al., in
the Case of Gonzales v. Carhart, 34 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 69, 71 (2006) (noting that
the Court has a “constitutional obligation to exercise its own independent legal
judgment” and that by relying entirely on the Legislature’s choices, courts
would “ignore these well-settled constitutional principles and would have the
legislative fox guarding the constitutional henhouse”).
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22 of the Alaska Constitution.29 In privacy cases, the court either applies
a “compelling interest” test30 or intermediate scrutiny31 depending on
whether the individual has a fundamental right and whether the
individual’s action “interferes in a serious manner with the health,
safety, rights and privileges of others or with the public welfare.”32
Through independent analysis of the legislative history and prior
cases, this Note aims to demonstrate that the Alaska courts have been
correctly interpreting article I, section 19 of the Alaska Constitution by
eschewing strict scrutiny when reviewing constitutional challenges to
felon-in-possession statutes. The legislative history of section 19, as well
as its interpretation by the Alaska courts, demonstrates that at most the
proper standard is a level of review that requires a “close and
substantial relationship” to a legitimate government interest. This
standard satisfies Alaska’s desire for strong protections against
government intrusions,33 but it still allows statutes that prohibit firearm
possession by felons.
Part I of this Note begins by reviewing the history of article I,
section 19 of the Alaska Constitution and its similarities to the Second
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. This portion next conducts a
thorough examination of the legislative history of the 1994 amendment,
which reveals a legislative intent to clarify an individual right to bear
arms and to retain restrictions for convicted felons. The Note then
assesses the effect of the election pamphlet given to voters in the 1994
election. Part I.D looks at the three pre-Wilson cases that addressed
section 19 claims in the aftermath of the 1994 amendment. Lastly, Part II
of the Note contends that even if an argument could be made for
implementing strict scrutiny, stare decisis requires that the courts

29. See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22 (explicitly guaranteeing the right to privacy
in Alaska).
30. Strict scrutiny in this context requires that the “constraints are justified
by a compelling state interest, and no less restrictive means could advance that
interest.” See, e.g., Valley Hosp. Ass’n v. Mat-Su Coal. for Choice, 948 P.2d 963,
969 (Alaska 1997).
31. Intermediate scrutiny in this context requires that legislation bear a
“close and substantial relationship” to a “legitimate state interest.” Ravin v.
State, 537 P.2d 494, 506 (Alaska 1975).
32. Compare Valley Hosp. Ass’n, 948 P.2d at 969 (applying strict scrutiny to a
woman’s fundamental right to reproductive choice), with Ravin, 537 P.2d at 506
(applying intermediate scrutiny when defendant had no fundamental right to
possess marijuana and his action might interfere “in a serious manner with the
health, safety, rights and privileges of others or with the public welfare”).
33. See Ravin, 537 P.2d at 515–16 (Boochever, J., concurring) (affirmatively
stating that the test employed in Ravin is a departure from the two-tier strict
scrutiny/rational basis model and that it implements a balancing test that
explicitly rejects looking for a mere rational basis).
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continue utilizing a lower standard of review when considering felon-inpossession firearm challenges.

I.
A.

JUDICIAL SCRUTINY AND THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS

General Background of Article I, Section 19

In 1955, four years before Alaska became a state, delegates from
across the territory convened in Fairbanks to craft a constitution that
would bolster their case for statehood.34 The delegates chose to use the
United States Constitution as a framework with the idea that by
mirroring the U.S. Constitution, their chances for being granted
statehood would increase substantially.35 In fact, many sections of the
Alaska Constitution use wording almost identical to that found in the
U.S. Constitution.36 One such provision is section 19 of article I, which
states “A well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free
state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be
infringed.”37 This controversial clause closely tracks the Second
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, the meaning of which has been
heavily debated for many years.
Currently, the ultimate meaning of the Second Amendment is
becoming clearer.38 Prior to the United States Supreme Court’s rulings in
Heller and McDonald, though, there was no definitive answer to whether
the amendment provided a “collective” right—one connected to service
in a militia—or an “individual” right—one that was not militia-related.39

34. GORDON S. HARRISON, ALASKA LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS AGENCY, ALASKA'S
CONSTITUTION: A CITIZEN'S GUIDE 3 (4th ed. 2002), available at http://
w3.legis.state.ak.us/docs/pdf/citizens_guide.pdf.
35. Id.
36. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 4 (“No law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”); cf. U.S.
CONST. amend. I (using identical language).
37. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 19; cf. U.S. CONST. amend. II (“A well regulated
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to
keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”).
38. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008) (announcing
that the Second Amendment guarantees an individual right to bear arms); see
also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (announcing that
the Second Amendment is applicable to the states via the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment).
39. Adam Winkler, The Reasonable Right to Bear Arms, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y
REV. 597, 597–600 (2006) (stating that the debate regarding the Second
Amendment has been almost entirely focused on whether it protects an
individual or collective right). Winkler defines the individual versus collective
argument as a “first-order” question, while noting the debate regarding
standard of review is merely a “second-order” question that has unanimously
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As federal case law developed, it became apparent that the prevailing
opinion was that the Second Amendment provided only a collective
right to bear arms.40 In response, many states began amending their
constitutions to clarify that their “right to bear arms” provisions were
intended to create an individual right.41 The Alaska Legislature had
attempted to add a similar provision repeatedly, but the proposals never
made it out of the Legislature.42 In 1994, however, Alaska finally joined
these other states by amending article I, section 19 of its constitution.43
The amendment added the sentence: “The individual right to keep and

been decided in favor of deferential scrutiny. Id. at 597–98. Winkler’s conclusion
was that even if the Second Amendment was construed to give rise to an
individual right, it would be mainly symbolic and would not affect most firearm
restrictions. Id. at 613.
40. See United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016, 1019–20 (8th Cir. 1992); United
States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384, 387 (10th Cir. 1977); United States v. Warin, 530
F.2d 103, 106 (6th Cir. 1976); Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 921–23 (1st Cir.
1942). Following the 1994 amendment to the Alaska Constitution, the trend grew
stronger as even more circuits adopted the collective right interpretation of the
Second Amendment. See Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693, 710 (7th
Cir. 1999); United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 286 (3d Cir. 1996); Love v.
Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120, 124 (4th Cir. 1995). Most importantly, though, was the
1996 decision supporting a collective right in the Ninth Circuit. See Hickman v.
Block, 81 F.3d 98, 101–02 (9th Cir. 1996) (expressly establishing that the Second
Amendment only guarantees a collective right). See generally Roger I. Roots, The
Approaching Death of the Collective Right Theory of the Second Amendment, 39 DUQ.
L. REV. 71, 77–78 (2000) (explaining which circuits emphasized that the Second
Amendment guaranteed a collective right rather than an individual right to bear
arms).
41. See Nicholas J. Johnson, A Second Amendment Moment: The Constitutional
Politics of Gun Control, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 715, 736–39 (2005) (detailing other
states’ movements to amend their constitutions to include or clarify an
individual right to bear arms). Prior to Alaska’s amendment in 1994, Nebraska
(in 1988) and Maine (in 1987) each passed amendments to assure their citizens
that the right to bear arms was individual rather than collective. Id. at 736. More
importantly, Utah enacted a similar amendment in 1984 to guarantee an
individual right. Id. at 738–39. Utah’s amendment is especially apropos because
its original language used the term “people” similar to the U.S. Constitution and
the Alaska Constitution. Id. In 1984, though, the state eliminated the ambiguity
by explicitly using the term “individual right.” Id. at 739.
42. See MINUTES OF THE S. FIN. COMM., Feb. 15, 1994, 18th Leg., Tape SFC-94,
No.
25,
Side
1,
available
at
http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/
get_single_minute.asp?house=S&session=18&comm=FIN&date=19940215&time
=0920 (statement of Co-Chairman Frank) (mentioning that amendments had
been suggested in past years).
43. To amend the Alaska Constitution, a proposed amendment must pass
both the Senate and the House of Representatives by a two-thirds vote. After the
amendment passes the Legislature, it is placed on the general election ballot. If it
receives more than fifty percent of the vote, the amendment is enacted. ALASKA
CONST. art. XIII, § 1. Additionally, when the amendment is placed on the ballot,
it must be presented with a summary prepared by the lieutenant governor. Id.
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bear arms shall not be denied or infringed by the State or a political
subdivision of the State.”44
B.

Legislative History of the 1994 Amendment

1. Senate State Affairs Committee
The 1994 amendment began its journey through the Alaska
Legislature as Senate Joint Resolution 39 (SJR 39). The first public
hearing on the resolution was held on January 21, 1994, in the Senate
State Affairs Committee.45 The summary for the resolution notes that “in
addition to the right of the people to keep and bear arms as approved by
the voters at the time of ratification of the state Constitution, . . . the
individual right to keep and bear arms shall not be denied or
infringed.”46 This summary mentions specifically that the amendment
aims to establish an individual right for the citizens of Alaska.47 But
nowhere in the summary is there any mention of a strict scrutiny
standard or indeed of any standard of review.
The first witness to testify at the hearing on the amendment was
Duane Udland, the Deputy Chief of Police for the Anchorage Police
Department.48 He noted that there was concern that the new amendment
would jeopardize the government’s ability to pass reasonable firearm
restrictions.49 However, as soon as Udland voiced this concern, the
chairman of the committee asked Portia Babcock, the Senate State
Affairs Committee legislative aide, to give an overview of the
amendment.50 And in response, Babcock announced that the purpose of
the Amendment was to “protect and insure [sic] the right to keep and
bear arms in the future.”51
Following Babcock’s remarks, Senator Dave Donley noted his belief
that “the proper judicial standard of review in terms of balancing
firearms rights of individuals versus the protection of society[] is a
compelling public safety interest standard.”52 Later in the hearing, after

44. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 19.
45. See MINUTES OF THE S. STATE AFFAIRS COMM., supra note 27, Tape 94-2, Side
B at no. 483 (statement of Chairman Leman).
46. See MINUTES OF THE S. FIN. COMM., supra note 42. This summary was
identical for each committee and never once mentioned a level of judicial
scrutiny. See, e.g., id.
47. See MINUTES OF THE S. STATE AFFAIRS COMM., supra note 27, Tape 94-2, Side
B at no. 483.
48. Id. at no. 463 (statement of Duane Udland).
49. Id. at no. 425.
50. Id. at no. 285 (statement of Chairman Leman).
51. Id. at no. 273 (statement of Portia Babcock).
52. Id. at no. 218 (statement of Senator Donley).
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Senator Loren Leman had advised a citizen that “SJR 39 will not restrict
municipalities from dealing with appropriate local restrictions on
firearms,” Senator Robin Taylor echoed Senator Donley’s comments
regarding standard of review.53 Senator Taylor expressed that “it is the
intent of the committee that a standard of compelling public safety
interest will allow municipalities and the state to continue to pass laws
regarding appropriate restrictions on the right to keep and bear arms.”54
One must note that Senator Taylor went so far as to state that
“appropriate” restrictions would still be allowed if SJR 39 passed.55
Senator Leman also reiterated, “[I]t is not [my] intent to restrict the
passage of laws regulating firearms where there is a concern of public
safety.”56 Furthermore, Senator Leman believed SJR 39 was necessary to
illuminate the meaning of article I, section 19 because of “concern that
current constitutional law could be interpreted as a collective right to
bear arms and not an individual right. This would clarify the right to
keep and bear arms as an individual right.”57
The hearing concluded with testimony from local individuals
whose comments focused on the need to pass SJR 39 and the argument
that all gun controls should be unconstitutional.58 Not one of these
witnesses made reference to a heightened form of judicial review. For
example, Dan Puritte stated, “the federal government is doing
everything it can to take away our freedom, our rights, and our guns.”59
This statement demonstrates the growing concern among Alaskans at
the time that article I, section 19 could be viewed as protecting only a
collective right. It was this fear that drove passage of the amendment—
not a desire to change the level of judicial scrutiny applied to firearm
restrictions. After all the witnesses testified, SJR 39 was discharged from
the Senate State Affairs Committee.60

53. Id. Tape 94-3, Side A at nos. 091–095 (statements of Chairman Leman and
Senator Taylor).
54. Id. at no. 095 (statement of Senator Taylor).
55. Id. This is an example of the Legislature clearly stating its desire that
certain prohibitions, such as those relating to felons in possession, be maintained
even if merely “appropriate.” This language suggests a standard of review
much more relaxed than strict scrutiny.
56. Id. at no. 142 (statement of Chairman Leman).
57. Id.
58. See Wilson v. State, 207 P.3d 565, 574 (Alaska Ct. App. 2009)
(Mannheimer, J., dissenting) (listing three witnesses in order to demonstrate the
public opinion regarding SJR 39).
59. See MINUTES OF THE S. STATE AFFAIRS COMM., supra note 27, Tape 94-2, Side
B at no. 183 (statement of Dan Puritte).
60. Id. Tape 94-3, Side A at no. 180 (statement of Chairman Leman).
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2. Senate Judiciary Committee
SJR 39 then went to the Senate Judiciary Committee on February 4,
1994.61 Senator Leman, the chair of the committee where the proposal
was introduced, opened the discussion by reiterating that the
amendment would not bar governmental bodies from passing firearm
restrictions.62 Furthermore, he noted, “the consensus of his hearings was
that any change to the constitution should be clear and as simple as
possible.”63 Since the people of Alaska had growing concerns that article
I, section 19 (a nearly exact replica of the Second Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution) was going to be construed as protecting only a collective
right, they wanted to act quickly to cement their right to keep and bear
arms as an individual one. Legislators likely feared that language
implicating the standard of review would hinder the amendment’s
successful passage on the ballot.
Assistant Attorney General Dean Guaneli was the first witness to
testify about SJR 39 at the Senate Judiciary Committee hearing.64 Guaneli
expressed concerns that SJR 39 could cause the courts to impose strict
scrutiny and overturn existing laws such as the convicted-felon-inpossession laws.65 Senator Leman, however, quashed this suggestion by
stating “Mr. Guaneli’s fear of a clean constitutional amendment [i]s not
founded in fact” and “appropriate restrictions [would still be valid after
this amendment].”66 While it is true that Senator Donley then stated that
the proper level of review should be strict scrutiny, he immediately
undercut this statement by asserting that “the compelling public safety
interest should be the test regarding whether laws are upheld or not;
with firearms very few safety requirements are not reasonable.”67
61. Bill History/Action for 18 Legislature, Bill SJR 39, ALASKA STATE
LEGISLATURE (May 27, 1994), http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/get_complete_
bill.asp?session=18&bill=SJR39.
62. MINUTES OF THE S. JUDICIARY COMM., Feb. 4, 1994, 18th Leg., Tape 94-6,
Side B at no. 523, available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/get_single_
minute.asp?house=S&session=18&comm=JUD&date=19940204&time=1342
(statement of Senator Leman).
63. Id. (emphasis added).
64. Id. (statement of Dean Guaneli).
65. Id.
66. Id. at no. 240 (statement of Senator Leman).
67. Id. at no. 121 (statement of Senator Donley) (emphasis added). Senator
Donley later weakened this position even further by submitting a letter of intent,
which revealed that he had a standard other than strict scrutiny in mind for
felon-in-possession challenges. See S. JOURNAL, 18th Leg., 2d Sess. 3032–34
(Alaska 1994), available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/get_single_
journal.asp?session=18&date=19940302&beg_page=3019&end_page=3049&cha
mber=S; see also infra Part I.B.4 (discussing Senator Donley’s letter of intent and
how it demonstrates that he actually was referring to a lesser standard than
strict scrutiny as courts apply it with regards to convicted felons).
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After Portia Babcock testified that municipalities support SJR 3968
and Senator Donley noted he would file a letter of intent regarding the
standard of review for the proposed amendment,69 the Senate Judiciary
Committee passed SJR 39.70
3. Senate Finance Committee
The next public discussion of the bill occurred in the Senate Finance
Committee on February 15, 1994.71 Portia Babcock, aide to the Senate
State Affairs Committee, again was asked to testify.72 She clearly stated
that the resolution was intended “to better guarantee the individual
right to keep and bear arms in the future for the state of Alaska.”73 She
then went on to note that over “the past ten years this issue had come up
and in polls taken it was estimated that [seventy-eight to ninety] percent
of Alaskans supported this resolution . . . to better guarantee the
individual right to keep and bear arms.”74
It is particularly important to note the time period to which
Babcock referred in her statements. The ten-year period preceding 1994
was the time during which federal courts of appeal were creating
precedent that the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
protected a collective right rather than an individual right.75 And
perhaps more importantly, this period came immediately after a 1983
Alaska Attorney General opinion stated that article I, section 19
conferred only a collective right to bear arms.76 Only after Babcock again
mentioned the public support for an amendment to clarify an individual
right did the topic of judicial review even come into play.77 Senator
Steve Rieger questioned her regarding how it would affect current
firearm restrictions and again Babcock (similar to Senator Leman)
asserted that it was aimed only at “very unreasonable restrictions.”78
Mr. Guaneli was also present at this meeting, and he repeated his
concerns about SJR 39.79 He posited that some firearm restrictions might
68. MINUTES OF THE S. JUDICIARY COMM., supra note 62, Tape 94-6, Side A at
no. 200 (statement of Portia Babcock).
69. Id. at no. 250 (statement of Senator Donley).
70. Id. at no. 290 (statement of Senator Jacko).
71. MINUTES OF THE S. FIN. COMM., supra note 42.
72. Id.
73. Id. (statement of Portia Babcock).
74. Id.
75. See supra note 40.
76. See 2 Op. Att’y Gen. Alaska 1, 1983 Alas. AG Lexis 322, File No. 366-44483 (Alaska 1983).
77. See MINUTES OF THE S. FIN. COMM., supra note 42 (statement of Portia
Babcock).
78. Id. (statement of Senator Rieger).
79. Id. (statement of Dean J. Guaneli).
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be questioned under the amendment if there was no explicit provision
stating that the current standard of review would remain applicable.80
Guaneli later stated, however, that “this resolution did not give the court
enough to go on for intent.”81 But again, when Guaneli raised these
concerns, a senator immediately addressed his opinions. Senator Frank
explained that he “did not see any heightened protection in this
amendment but a clarification that it was an individual rather than a
collective right.”82 Guaneli responded to this statement by noting that
courts view changes to the constitution as an instruction that something
has changed.83 Guaneli observed that the proposed amendment may
indicate that “instead of a reasonable basis test, the Legislature wanted
to apply some higher standard of scrutiny.”84 Seemingly in response to
such concerns, Senator Donley produced a letter of intent regarding the
proper standard of review.85
4. Senate Floor
The full Senate convened on March 2, 1994, to vote on SJR 39.86 At
the beginning of this meeting, Senator Donley provided a letter of intent
for SJR 39.87 It had three main points: (1) SJR 39 was not to be used to
interfere with private conduct; (2) SJR 39 should be considered to
implement a “legitimate and compelling governmental interest”
standard to restrictions on firearm access; and (3) SJR 39 “does not

80. See id.
81. Id. This comment was made in regard to a possible heightened scrutiny
that may attach if rational basis was not expressly noted as the proper standard
of review.
82. Id. (statement of Co-Chairman Frank).
83. Wilson v. State, 207 P.3d 565, 578 (Alaska Ct. App. 2009) (Mannheimer, J.,
dissenting).
84. MINUTES OF THE S. FIN. COMM., supra note 42 (statement of Dean J.
Guaneli).
85. See S. JOURNAL, supra note 67, at 3033. In Alaska, letters of intent written
by legislators are relevant legislative history and can provide insight into the
Legislature’s understanding of a bill. See LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE LIBRARY,
ALASKA STATE LEGISLATURE, GUIDE TO ALASKA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY MATERIALS 3
(2009), available at http://w3.legis.state.ak.us/docs/pdf/leghistory/Legh.pdf.
86. S. JOURNAL, supra note 67, at 3032.
87. Id. at 3032–34. The letter of intent was agreed to by a vote of fifteen to
four, with Senator Jacko absent during the vote. Id. at 3035. SJR 39 was then
voted on and passed by a fifteen to five margin that included Senator Jacko. Id.
After the voting, Senator Duncan gave notice of reconsideration, and the final
vote was held the next day on March 3, 1994. The letter of intent and SJR 39 were
both passed by a vote of sixteen to three, with Senator Kelly being excused from
voting. Id. at 3064–65, available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/
get_single_journal.asp?session=18&date=19940303&beg_page=3051&end_page=
3076&chamber=S.
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prevent the legislature from limiting access and possession of arms by
convicted felons and those convicted of crimes of violence.”88
The letter of intent began by mentioning the distinct similarity
between the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and article I,
section 19 of the Alaska Constitution.89 Next, Senator Donley expressed
the intent to use a “legitimate and compelling governmental interest”
standard to review constitutional challenges arising under SJR 39.90
Noting the comparability between the wording of this amendment and
the phrasing of article I, section 22 (which guarantees the right to
privacy),91 Senator Donley argued that the standard of review used in
cases under section 22 should be borrowed and made to apply to
challenges to gun laws.92 Specifically, Senator Donley asserted that
“interference with the right may be justified only by a legitimate and
compelling governmental interest”—which is the test used for privacy
challenges.93
The last section of the letter of intent provided a specific legislative
finding that the Legislature had the ability to prohibit possession of
firearms by convicted felons or people convicted of crimes of violence.94
Senator Donley explicitly stated that “the proposed amendment of art. I,
sec. 19 does not preclude the appropriate exercise of the police power.”95
He followed this statement by asserting that
the legislature finds that there is both a legitimate and a
compelling governmental interest in the enactment and
enforcement of legislation prohibiting the possession of and
access to firearms by those who, by their past conduct, have
demonstrated an unfitness to be entrusted with their
possession. . . . Specifically the legislature finds a legitimate and
a compelling governmental interest in the enactment and
enforcement of legislation limiting access and possession of

88. Id. at 3032–34, available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/
get_single_journal.asp?session=18&date=19940302&beg_page=3019&end_page=
3049&chamber=S.
89. Id. at 3032. Because of this resemblance, the senator urged that the
interpretation of the Second Amendment (that it “does not apply to regulate or
interfere with private conduct”) is equally applicable to article I, section 19. Id. at
3032–33.
90. Id. at 3033.
91. Id.
92. See id.
93. Id.; see also supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text (explaining the twotier standard of review system for privacy challenges).
94. S. JOURNAL, supra note 67, at 3034.
95. Id.
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arms by convicted felons and those convicted of crimes of
violence.96
This letter of intent indicates in a number of ways that the Alaska
felon-in-possession statute should not be subjected to strict scrutiny.
First, the document began by noting the comparability of the original
version of article I, section 19 with the Second Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution.97 Such a comparison again emphasizes the import of SJR
39: to clarify that Alaska had intended to create an individual right to
bear arms. Second, the Legislature stated its desire for courts reviewing
article I, section 19 claims to implement the standard of review utilized
for article I, section 22 claims regarding privacy. This is a flexible
standard that varies depending on the right involved and the effect that
the exercise of that right has on other members of the public.98 While
granting an individual right to bear arms would likely imply that the
interest is fundamental,99 this still would not prevent the courts from
utilizing the lower standard of review for convicted felons. In fact, the
United States Supreme Court has itself carved out an exception to
heightened scrutiny for convicted felons and other dangerous classes of
people.100 Moreover, even when the U.S. Constitution closely resembles
the Alaska Constitution, the Alaska Supreme Court has noted:

96. Id.
97. See id. at 3032.
98. See supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text.
99. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3042 (2010) (holding “it
is clear that the Framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment counted the
right to keep and bear arms among those fundamental rights necessary to our
system of ordered liberty”). The language “ordered liberty” is very similar to
that used by the Alaska Supreme Court when determining whether a right is
fundamental. See Baker v. Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386, 401–02 (Alaska 1970). Thus, it
is worth noting that even though McDonald deemed the right to bear arms
fundamental, it expressly affirmed the notion in District of Columbia v. Heller that
its holding “did not cast doubt on such longstanding regulatory measures as
‘prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons.’” McDonald, 130 S. Ct at
3047 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008)).
100. See, e.g., Heller, 554 U.S. at 629 nn.26–27 (affirming the constitutionality of
felon-in-possession laws because they were “presumptively lawful regulatory
measures” but requiring heightened judicial scrutiny for most other Second
Amendment challenges by asserting that rational basis review is inappropriate).
This appears to be the Court’s method of carving out an exception to the
requirement for heightened scrutiny because the defining feature of rational
basis review is that laws are presumed valid. See Lindsay Goldberg, Note,
District of Columbia v. Heller: Failing to Establish a Standard for the Future, 68 MD.
L. REV. 889, 911 (2009) (noting that strict scrutiny would work for most Second
Amendment claims, but there would have to be “exceptions where a more
deferential standard is appropriate”).
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We are free, and we are under a duty, to develop
additional constitutional rights and privileges under our
Alaska Constitution if we find such fundamental rights and
privileges to be within the intention and spirit of our local
constitutional language and to be necessary for the kind of
civilized life and ordered liberty which is at the core of our
constitutional heritage.101
The phrase “necessary for the kind of civilized life and ordered
liberty” provides ample justification for the court to differentiate
convicted felons from other citizens asserting their article I, section 19
right. By having committed a felony, regardless of whether it was
violent in nature, the convicted felon has shown an indifference towards
maintaining “ordered liberty.”102
In Alaska, the Senate history reveals a manifest intention to retain
felon-in-possession restrictions. The Senate could not have been clearer
when it announced its intent to promote legislation that prevented all
convicted felons from possessing firearms. Furthermore, when making
this legislative finding, Senator Donley explicitly disconnected the term
“convicted felons” from the separate category of “those convicted of
crimes of violence.”103 That is, the Senate sought to prohibit all persons
convicted of felonies (including non-violent felonies) from possessing
firearms. However, such a categorical prohibition would likely lead to
problems with over-inclusivity under a strict scrutiny review.
Intermediate scrutiny, on the other hand, would require only a
substantial relationship, which could be met by the State showing a
general correlation between convicted felons and propensity for future
criminal activity with firearms.104 In short, the Senate meant to keep
wide-ranging felon-in-possession restrictions; application of strict
scrutiny would make it less likely that such broad restrictions would

101. Baker, 471 P.2d at 401–02.
102. See United States v. Everist, 368 F.3d 517, 519 (5th Cir. 2004)
(“Irrespective of whether his offense was violent in nature, a felon has shown
manifest disregard for the rights of others. He may not justly complain of the
limitation on his liberty when his possession of firearms would otherwise
threaten the security of his fellow citizens.”). This case is especially persuasive
since the Fifth Circuit had already deemed the Second Amendment to grant an
individual right by 2004. See United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 260 (5th
Cir. 2001).
103. See S. JOURNAL, supra note 67, at 3034.
104. See United States v. Miller, 604 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1171–72 (W.D. Tenn.
2009) (holding that the federal felon-in-possession statute survives intermediate
scrutiny); see also United States v. Schultz, No. 1:08-CR-75-TS, 2009 WL 35225, at
*5 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 5, 2009).
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pass constitutional muster, which in turn suggests that the Legislature
viewed a lesser level of scrutiny to be appropriate.
5. House Judiciary Committee
SJR 39 first appeared in the House Judiciary Committee on April
16, 1994.105 There were two major issues addressed during this meeting:
(1) the main purpose of the amendment, which was to clarify that article
I, section 19 granted an individual right to keep and bear arms; and (2)
whether to accept a committee substitute version that added the word
“unreasonably” to the amendment.106 Under that proposal, the
individual right to keep and bear arms could not be “unreasonably”
denied by the State. All members of the committee and the witnesses
who testified appeared to agree on the first issue.107 As noted above, a
1983 Opinion by the Alaska Attorney General had suggested that article
I, section 19 protected only a collective right.108 In the 1994 House
Judiciary meeting, multiple people testified regarding this 1983
opinion.109 Portia Babcock, as the Senate State Affairs Committee
legislative aide, explained the effect of this opinion: “[i]t was only after
this opinion was written in 1983 that they started questioning whether
they actually had an individual right to bear arms . . . . When that was
brought into question, people wanted this clarified.”110 Chairman Porter
seconded this belief and noted “the only law in the books is the attorney
general’s opinion that says there is no individual right to keep and bear
arms in the state of Alaska. Consequently. . .we would like to expand
that to recognize the individual right to keep and bear arms.”111
Discussion during the House Judiciary meeting centered upon the
inclusion of the word “unreasonably.”112 Such concerns mirrored the

105. MINUTES OF THE H. JUDICIARY COMM., Apr. 16, 1994, 18th Leg., Tape 94-60,
Side A at no. 210 (Alaska 1994), available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/
get_single_minute.asp?house=H&session=18&comm=JUD&date=19940416&tim
e=1300.
106. See generally id. at nos. 252–764. The amended proposal read: “The
individual right to keep and bear arms shall not be unreasonably denied or
infringed by the State or a political subdivision of the State.” It also would have
amended article XV, section 29 to read: “The 1994 amendment of Section 19 of
Article I does not change the level of judicial scrutiny applicable to the review of
laws relating to weapons.” Id.
107. See id. at nos. 252–807.
108. See id. at no. 287 (statement of Portia Babcock).
109. See, e.g., id. at no. 764 (statement of Chairman Porter) (reminding
everyone that “the attorney general’s opinion is in effect until it is superseded by
law, or challenged”).
110. Id. at no. 287 (statement of Portia Babcock).
111. Id. at no. 750 (statement of Chairman Porter).
112. See generally id. at nos. 508–807.
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complaints that had been heard in the Senate, where it was feared that if
the term “unreasonably” were included in the amendment, courts might
continue using only rational basis review.113 This standard worried
members of the Committee because they thought it would be too low to
protect against illegitimate government intrusion into the right they
were trying to protect.114 Portia Babcock claimed, “they are worried
about the courts using that word unreasonably to mean any law that has
any positive justification [should be upheld], rather than [requiring
proof of] a compelling governmental interest” to uphold a law that
limits the right.115 Representative Phillips repeated the fear about
releasing an amendment with the potential for reasonableness review
when she noted that she “did not agree that the people of Alaska would
buy into adding the word ‘unreasonably’ or the level of judicial scrutiny
as part of our constitutional statement on the right to bear arms.”116 This
critical statement perfectly encapsulates why the other versions of SJR 39
were repeatedly shot down. As Representative Phillips pointed out, the
omission resulted from legislators’ conclusions that their constituents
might not accept the passage of a bill that had any wording related to a
standard of review.117
Witnesses also expressly declared their opposition to the word
“unreasonably.”118 Conspicuously absent from any of their comments,
though, was any reference to a form of strict scrutiny. The voters’ main
concern regarding this proposal was that it would ensure an individual

113. See McCracken v. State, 743 P.2d 382, 384 (Alaska Ct. App 1987) (holding
§ 11.61.200(b) constitutional on equal protection grounds because the “statute is
a reasonable and rational attempt to achieve the statutory goal. Nothing more is
required.”). This standard exemplifies rational basis review and its extreme
judicial deference, which legislators and citizens alike wanted to avoid for
constitutional analysis under article I, section 19.
114. See MINUTES OF THE H. JUDICIARY COMM., supra note 105, at no. 508
(statement of Portia Babcock).
115. Id.
116. MINUTES OF THE H. JUDICIARY COMM., Apr. 18, 1994, 18th Leg., Tape 94-61,
Side B at no. 000 (Alaska 1994) available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/
get_single_minute.asp?ch=H&beg_line=1071&end_line=1344&session=18&com
m=JUD&date=19940418&time=1300 (statement of Representative Phillips).
117. Id.; see also MINUTES OF THE H. JUDICIARY COMM., supra note 105, at no. 440
(statement of Portia Babcock). Regarding including standard of review in the
amendment, Babcock stated: “People who are going in to vote on this would
have no idea what this means.” Id. This is an excellent point by Ms. Babcock and
perfectly encapsulates why the courts are ultimately responsible for choosing the
level of scrutiny to apply to laws that are facing constitutional challenges.
118. See, e.g., MINUTES OF THE H. JUDICIARY COMM., supra note 105, at no. 200
(statement of Konrad Schaad) (stating that “he comes in contact with hundreds
of people. Of those people, nobody is in opposition to the bill, but they do
oppose the term ‘unreasonably.’”).
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right to bear arms and that if adopted, it could not be restricted by
judges who exercised wide latitude under the term “unreasonably.”
Such concerns could have been alleviated through the use of the
“close and substantial relationship” test for felon-in-possession laws.
These restrictions are not rubber-stamped by the judiciary but must
demonstrate a substantial relationship to a legitimate government
interest.119 Indeed, this standard—as opposed to strict scrutiny—most
closely resembles the one described by legislators through the legislative
history regarding felon-in-possession restrictions.
After hearing from witnesses, the committee ended the meeting
and scheduled a closed meeting for April 18.120 Chairman Porter decided
to propose his substitute bill that included the term “unreasonably”
even though he knowingly acknowledged the public’s disagreement
with it.121 The substitute bill passed122 and then went to the House
Finance Committee for review.
6. House Finance Committee
Representative Porter’s proposal and SJR 39 were addressed in the
House Finance Committee on April 30, 1994.123 Portia Babcock opened
the proceedings by remarking on the status of article I, section 19:
“[c]urrent language is ambiguous, whereas, several attempts have been
made in past Legislature[s] to clarify the right of the ‘individual’ citizen
to own a firearm.”124 Next, Representative Porter testified in favor of the
substitute version that contained the word “unreasonably.”125 He noted
that it was safer to include this phrase and that opponents were overly
worried about the effect of this word.126
Mr. Guaneli, the Assistant Attorney General at the time, followed
and mentioned that “the Alaska Supreme Court uses a sliding scale of
scrutiny which applies to the Constitution and state laws for protection

119. See, e.g., Gibson v. State, 930 P.2d 1300, 1302 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
120. MINUTES OF THE H. JUDICIARY COMM., supra note 105, at no. 675.
121. MINUTES OF THE H. JUDICIARY COMM., supra note 116, at no. 129 (statement
of Chairman Porter).
122. Id.
123. MINUTES OF THE H. FIN. COMM., Apr. 30, 1994, 18th Leg., Tape 94-149, Side
1, at nos. 0–end (Alaska 1994), available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/
get_single_minute.asp?house=H&session=18&comm=FIN&date=19940430&tim
e=1350.
124. Id. (statement of Portia Babcock).
125. Id. at no. 2 (statement of Representative Brian Porter).
126. Id. Representative Porter referenced the term “unreasonable” as used in
the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. He claimed that courts had
properly applied protections to the right guaranteed by this Amendment even
though it emphasized the term “unreasonable.” Id. at nos. 2, 7–8.
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challenges.”127 Guaneli then noted that rational basis is at the lower end
of the scale and that he “thought the firearm laws would fall in the
lower end category and that the amendment would increase the level of
scrutiny the Courts would apply to gun laws.”128
At the hearing, Representative Sean Parnell, now the Alaska
Governor, “questioned the amendment to SJR 39 which would change
the level of judicial scrutiny [pertaining] to laws relating to
weapons.’”129 As a result of a lengthy exchange with Guaneli regarding
potential effects on firearm regulations under rational basis review,
Representative Parnell voted to support the Senate version of SJR 39.130
Again, though, this does not signify a mandate to utilize strict scrutiny
for all firearm restrictions (including felon-in-possession restrictions) but
rather demonstrates legislators’ worries about the leniency of rational
basis or reasonableness review.
After brief discussion, the committee then approved SJR 39 as it
was written in the Senate by a vote of six to two.131
7. House Floor
The final stop in the legislative process for SJR 39 was a vote on the
House floor. On May 2, 1994, Representative Porter made one last effort
to insert the word “unreasonable” into the language of the
amendment.132 The suggested change was again voted down, but this
time the vote was a fairly close twenty-four to fifteen.133 After two
unrelated proposals by Representative John Davies were rejected, the
House scheduled a vote on SJR 39 for the following day.134 On May 3,
1994, the full House voted thirty-three to four in favor of passage.135
Representative Porter made yet another effort to soften the effect of
SJR 39 by submitting a letter of intent for the proposal.136 The letter of
intent explained that the new right would not be guaranteed “when the
legislature has determined that such conduct is contrary to the public

127. Id. at no. 2 (statement of Dean Guaneli).
128. Id.
129. Id. at no. 2 (statement of Representative Parnell).
130. See id. at nos. 2–3.
131. Id. at no. 3.
132. 1994 H.R. JOURNAL 3936–37, 18th Leg., 2d. Sess. (Alaska 1994), available at
http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/get_single_journal.asp?session=18&date=1
9940502&beg_page=3899&end_page=3945&chamber=H.
133. Id. at 3937.
134. Id. at 3939–40.
135. Id. at 3972–73, available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/
get_single_journal.asp?session=18&date=19940503&beg_page=3947&end_page=
3985&chamber=H.
136. Id. at 3973.
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interest.”137 This proposed standard is extraordinarily vague and would
create more questions than answers. Fittingly, the House rejected this
letter of intent by a vote of twenty-three to fourteen.138 After voting
down the letter of intent, Representative Navarre moved for
reconsideration.139 The last vote on SJR 39 was held on May 4, 1994, and
it passed convincingly by a tally of thirty-six to three.140
C.

1994 Election Pamphlet

SJR 39 was presented to the voters as Ballot Measure No. 1 in the
1994 general election.141 The proposal was accompanied by a position
statement from supporters of the proposal, a statement by people in
opposition to the proposal, and a neutral statement provided by the
Legislative Affairs Agency.142 As Judge Mannheimer appropriately
pointed out, none of the three statements contained any mention of strict
scrutiny or any discussion of a change to the level of judicial scrutiny to
be applied to firearm restrictions.143 He also noted the statement by the
Legislative Affairs Agency, which read: “This measure amends the state
constitution by adding a specific reference to the individual right to
keep and bear arms.”144 There is nothing to suggest that voters had any
idea that the ballot implicated the standard of review, and thus, it is
apparent that voters gave their approval only to the specification of the
individual right. In short, the neutral position statement provided by the
governmental agency informed the voters of the critical issue they were
deciding: whether the Alaska Constitution should guarantee an
individual right to keep and bear arms. The voters believed it should,
and the amendment passed with 72.7% of the vote.145
Furthermore, the statement in support of the amendment
specifically noted that convicted felons would be excluded from
exercising the right.146 It consistently referred to “law-abiding citizen”
137. Id.
138. Id. at 3973–74.
139. Id. at 3974.
140. Id. at 3991–92, available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/
get_single_journal.asp?session=18&date=19940504&beg_page=3987&end_page=
4013&chamber=H.
141. ALASKA, DIV. OF ELECTIONS, ALASKA 1994 OFFICIAL ELECTION PAMPHLET B20 (1994).
142. See id.
143. Wilson v. State, 207 P.3d 565, 583–84 (Alaska Ct. App. 2009)
(Mannheimer, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 584 (quoting ALASKA, DIV. OF ELECTIONS, supra note 141).
145. See 1994 General Election Official Results, supra note 1.
146. ALASKA, DIV. OF ELECTIONS, supra note 141. Based on the supporter’s
statement in the election pamphlet, one could think that voters desired not to
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when describing who would be able to benefit from the new right.147 It
also explicitly stated that “YES on #1 will NOT stop or restrict public
safety officials from punishing or prohibiting the possession of arms by
those who misuse arms, nor does it protect criminals or delinquents who
misuse arms. These individuals would be excluded from enjoyment of
this right.”148
D.

Case Law Interpreting 1994 Amendment

1. Gibson v. State
The Alaska Court of Appeal’s first application of the 1994
amendment came in 1997 in Gibson v. State.149 In Gibson, the defendant
was seen armed with an AK-47 rifle while intoxicated on his property.150
He was charged with possessing a firearm while intoxicated under
section 11.61.210(a)(1) of the Alaska Statutes.151 He pled no contest but
preserved the right to argue on appeal that the statute was
unconstitutional when applied to people intoxicated on their own
property.152 The Alaska Court of Appeals first determined whether
section 11.61.210(a)(1) was constitutional under article I, section 19.153
The court reviewed the legislative history and voter pamphlet associated
with the 1994 amendment to determine the contours of the newly
created individual right.154 The court noted that the legislative history
was full of statements that indicated the amendment should not affect
any current regulations regarding firearms.155 Additionally, the court
relied heavily upon the advocates’ statement, which was found in the
election pamphlet and favored upholding the law.156 Taking these

invalidate firearm restrictions. Judge Mannheimer, though, accurately observed
that this is an imperfect assumption since some voters may have wanted to pass
the amendment regardless. See Wilson v. State, 207 P.3d 565, 589 (Alaska Ct.
App. 2009) (Mannheimer, J., dissenting). But cf. Hickel v. Halford, 872 P.2d 171,
178 n.12 (Alaska 1994) (holding that the voter “pamphlet is an authoritative
source of the voters’ common understanding of section 17”). In Hickel, the court
noted that the statement in support of the amendment resulted in a “clear”
understanding of a term in the constitution when viewed in connection with the
language in the provision. Id. at 178.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. 930 P.2d 1300 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
150. Id. at 1301.
151. ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.210(a)(1) (2010).
152. See Gibson, 930 P.2d at 1300–01.
153. See id. at 1301.
154. See id. at 1301–02.
155. Id. at 1301.
156. Id. at 1302. According to the court, the advocates’ statement announced
specifically that “a ‘yes’ vote would NOT overturn or invalidate state laws
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factors into consideration, the court concluded that the amendment was
not intended to overturn the law regulating possession of firearms while
intoxicated.157
The court then considered whether the defendant was entitled to
special constitutional protection because he was on his own property
when found by the police.158 The defendant argued that “the individual
right to bear arms and the previously adopted state constitutional right
to privacy combine to create special constitutional protection for
possession of firearms in the home.”159 The court noted that the right to
bear arms is not absolute and neither is the right to privacy.160 Because
the right to privacy was implicated, the court applied the sliding scale
test it had previously used when addressing article I, section 22.161 As
noted earlier, the Senate’s letter of intent concerning SJR 39 had also
embraced the idea that courts use the same standard in “right to bear
arms” cases as was used in “right to privacy” cases.162 Here, the court
correctly applied the privacy test; thus, the right “may be restricted if the
restriction bears a close and substantial relationship to a legitimate
governmental interest.”163
Even though the court did not expressly recognize that there may
have been a fundamental right to bear arms in Alaska after 1994, the
court used the proper test because that fundamental right should not
extend to possessing firearms while intoxicated. It is analogous to the
supreme court’s rationale in Ravin v. State,164 which held that even
though Alaskans enjoy a fundamental right to privacy in their homes,
certain activities are not entitled to “fundamental” stature when they
may “interfere[] in a serious manner with the health, safety, rights and
privileges of others or with the public welfare.”165 The court in Gibson
concluded that the duty to defend the health and welfare of its citizens is
one of the most, if not the most, legitimate governmental interests the
state could use.166 The court then documented several instances of harm

restricting access or possession of arms by . . . those under the influence of drugs
or alcohol.” Id.
157. Id. at 1302–03.
158. Id. at 1301–02.
159. Id. at 1302. Alaska explicitly guarantees a right to privacy. See ALASKA
CONST. art. I, § 22.
160. Gibson, 930 P.2d at 1302.
161. Id.
162. S. JOURNAL, supra note 67, at 3032–34.
163. Gibson, 930 P.2d at 1302 (citing Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 511 (Alaska
1975)).
164. 537 P.2d 494.
165. Id. at 504.
166. Gibson, 930 P.2d at 1302.
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caused by intoxicated persons in possession of firearms.167 Therefore, it
upheld the statute because prohibiting the “possession of firearms while
intoxicated bears a close and substantial relationship to the state’s
legitimate interest in protecting the health and safety of its citizens.”168
However, in Wilson, Judge Mannheimer asserted in dissent that the
Gibson court had erred when it determined that the 1994 amendment
allowed the Legislature to enact firearms restrictions subject to a test of
reasonableness rather than strict scrutiny.169 In Gibson, though, the court
never mentioned a standard of mere reasonableness. The closest that it
got to that low standard was noting that the state remained able to pass
regulations on firearms when “there is a significant risk” that the people
being denied use of firearms would have wielded them in a “criminal or
dangerous fashion.”170 This statement resembles the intermediate
scrutiny-type approach that tries to determine whether a law bears a
close and substantial relationship to a legitimate government interest.
The court’s main concern in Ravin was that behavior inside the home,
even though constitutionally fundamentally protected, had to give way
to public welfare requirements when the activity was not one that
society valued.171 Here, it is likely that society would not value the right
to bear arms as strongly for an intoxicated man (as opposed to a sober
one) because as history has demonstrated, the intoxicated man presents
a significant risk of using the firearm in a dangerous fashion.172 This
type of analysis mirrors that conducted by the court in Gibson while
reviewing the defendant’s firearm challenge under article 1, section 22.
Had it been a test of mere reasonableness, the court would have used
terms such as “rationally related” or “reasonably related” to a
governmental interest.
As Judge Mannheimer points out in his dissent in Wilson, the court
in Gibson was incorrect when it stated “the history of the proposed
amendment contains no indications” of intent to apply strict scrutiny.173
As discussed above, there was evidence in the legislative history
revealing a desire to implement a heightened level of scrutiny to firearm
167. Id. (giving examples that included situations where an intoxicated man
used a firearm inside his house and killed his sister who was outside the front
door and where a man shot and killed his “drinking companion after an
argument” in his home).
168. Id.
169. Wilson v. State, 207 P.3d 565, 570–71 (Alaska Ct. App. 2009)
(Mannheimer, J., dissenting).
170. Gibson, 930 P.2d at 1301.
171. Ravin, 537 P.2d at 504.
172. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
173. See Wilson, 207 P.3d at 586 (Mannheimer, J., dissenting); Gibson, 930 P.2d
at 1302.
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regulations. Those examples, though, demonstrated both the
Legislature’s general aversion to the basic reasonableness test and its
aversion to strict scrutiny for felon-in-possession statutes. As seen
throughout the legislative history—including the Senate’s letter of
intent—the legislators who consistently utilized the term “compelling
state interest” made sure to include a statement that supported the
continued legitimacy of felon-in-possession laws.174 Therefore, it is likely
the legislators intended to institute an intermediate level of scrutiny
rather than strict scrutiny for certain dangerous classes of citizens. In
short, the Gibson court ultimately set good precedent in upholding the
constitutionality of a restriction barring intoxicated people from
possessing firearms.
The court in Gibson did not specifically announce a standard of
review for evaluating firearm restrictions after the 1994 amendment, but
it did lay the foundation for future decisions to rely on the “close and
substantial” relationship test when reviewing challenges to such
restrictions. As will be seen in the following cases, however, the court
elected to forego this route.
2. Morgan v. State
Six months after Gibson was decided, the court heard Morgan v.
State,175 an appeal questioning the constitutionality of section
11.61.200(a)(10) of the Alaska Statutes.176 This section prohibits a person
from “resid[ing] in a dwelling knowing that there is a firearm capable of
being concealed on one’s person or a prohibited weapon in the dwelling
if the person has been convicted of a felony.”177 In Morgan, the defendant
challenged his conviction on multiple grounds, including whether
section 11.61.200(a)(10) of the Alaska Statutes was invalidated after the
passage of the 1994 amendment to article I, section 19.178 In an opinion
authored by Judge Mannheimer, the court quickly dismissed the

174. See, e.g., S. JOURNAL, supra note 67, at 3032–34. While the Legislature
cannot ratify its own laws as constitutional, it is important for courts to view the
Legislature’s statements in order to apply its independent judgment. Hickel v.
Halford, 872 P.2d 171, 176–77 (Alaska 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(“Constitutional provisions should be given a reasonable and practical
interpretation in accordance with common sense. The court should look to the
plain meaning and purpose of the provision and the intent of the framers. . . .
[T]he court must look to the meaning that the voters would have placed on its
provisions.”).
175. 943 P.2d 1208 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
176. See id. at 1209.
177. ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.200(a)(10) (2010).
178. Morgan, 943 P.2d at 1209.
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defendant’s claim based on the analysis in Gibson.179 But instead of
entrenching the “close and substantial relationship” standard used in
Gibson, the court continued to use an ambiguous test that looks to
determine when “there is a significant risk that [convicted felons] will
use those firearms in a criminal or dangerous fashion.”180
3. Demars v. State181
In 1987, DeMars was convicted of a felony for leaving the scene of
an accident.182 Nine years later, he was visiting another person’s home
when the police were alerted that he possessed a handgun.183 DeMars
was charged with being a felon in possession of a concealable firearm.184
In 1999, DeMars appealed his conviction based on his claim that the 1994
amendment created doubt as to the constitutionality of section
11.61.200(a)(1) of the Alaska Statutes.185 The court relied upon the
analysis in Gibson but also emphasized that the legislative history and
election pamphlet clearly exemplified a consensus that the 1994
amendment would not affect laws regulating felons in possession of
concealable firearms.186 Once again, the court employed the test looking
for a “significant risk” that the firearms will be used “in a criminal or
dangerous fashion.” Based on these findings, the court rejected DeMars’
challenge based on the 1994 amendment.187

II. STARE DECISIS
In his concurrence in Wilson v. State, Judge Stewart applied the
principle of stare decisis to bolster the court’s conclusions.188 In Alaska,
stare decisis mandates that a court “should overrule a prior decision
only when ‘clearly convinced [that] the rule was originally erroneous or
is no longer sound because of changed conditions, and that more good

179. Id. at 1212.
180. Id. (quoting Gibson v. State, 930 P.2d 1300, 1301 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997)).
181. Nos. A-7002, 4100, 1999 WL 652444 (Alaska Ct. App. Aug. 18, 1999).
Although this is an unpublished decision that is not legally binding, it is being
used to fully articulate the history of the court’s interpretation of the 1994
amendment, especially since it regards the same law at issue in Wilson.
182. Id. at *1.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at *2. DeMars also challenged his conviction on equal protection
grounds, mistake-of-law defense, and the prohibition on ex post facto laws.
None of these other defenses were applicable to the 1994 amendment. Id. at *2–3.
186. Id. at *2.
187. Id.
188. See Wilson v. State, 207 P.3d 565, 569–70 (Alaska Ct. App. 2009) (Stewart,
J., concurring).
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than harm would result from a departure from precedent.’”189 Judge
Stewart issued conclusory statements that each prong was satisfied, but
they should be elaborated upon to resolve any doubts.
First, the original ruling in Gibson is not erroneous. While the court
could have further developed its analysis by including more legislative
history, its ultimate ruling was correct.190 Throughout the legislative
history, there are instances in which legislators specifically state that
certain restrictions on firearms would not be invalidated if the 1994
amendment passed.191 Furthermore, the court’s reliance on the election
pamphlet was not clearly erroneous,192 and the election pamphlet
mirrored the legislative history in stating that the amendment would not
invalidate current firearm regulations regarding felons.193 Moreover,
Judge Stewart was correct in focusing on the intent of the voters. The
Alaska Supreme Court has noted, “A constitutional provision, however,
must be ratified by the voters, and it is therefore also necessary to look
to the meaning that the voters would have placed on its provisions.”194
As an example, in State v. Lewis, the court had observed that “voters
were probably not privy to the comments of the delegates.”195 However,
the court then noted that the voters were clearly informed of the
provision’s purpose by the “unambiguous language” of a widely
distributed report.196 Here, on the other hand, the voters were in the
dark on the Legislature’s debates regarding the proposed constitutional
amendment. All they received was a voter pamphlet with a supporting
statement, opposition statement, and the neutral statement of the

189. Id. at 570 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Dunlop, 721 P.2d 604,
610 (Alaska 1986)).
190. Additionally, Gibson gave future courts the opportunity to apply
heightened scrutiny, but in their independent judgment, the court chose to carry
forward with the murkier standard looking for “significant risks” of use in a
“criminal and dangerous fashion.”
191. See supra Part I.B.
192. Before the Senate Finance Committee, Dean Guaneli testified that “[t]he
courts look largely at language used in voter pamphlets and the history behind the
legislation” when trying to determine the intent of an amendment. MINUTES OF
THE S. FIN. COMM., supra note 42 (emphasis added) (statement of Dean J.
Guaneli). This demonstrates that legislators were on notice that the election
pamphlet was important. Therefore, if the standard of review was important,
they would have made sure it got in the pamphlet, or at least prevented such
bold statements like the advocates’ from appearing on the ballot. See Hickel v.
Halford, 872 P.2d 171, 176–77 (Alaska 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(“[T]he court must look to the meaning that the voters would have placed on
[the constitutional] provisions.”).
193. ALASKA, DIV. OF ELECTIONS, supra note 141.
194. State v. Lewis, 559 P.2d 630, 637 (Alaska 1977).
195. Id. at 638.
196. Id.
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Legislative Affairs Agency.197 Since none of these statements mentioned
anything about the standard of review, it would be difficult to ascribe
any intent to the voters other than the clarification of an individual
right.198
Changed circumstances are the other reason why a prior case can
be overturned. But there have been no significant events since 1994 that
would qualify as changed circumstances to support overturning Gibson.
The United States Supreme Court’s rulings in Heller and McDonald
would be the only significant developments that could be considered to
have changed circumstances, but those decisions favor upholding
Gibson. When acknowledging an individual right to bear arms for the
first time, the majority opinion in Heller specifically asserted that special
classifications could still be made to prohibit certain people from
possessing firearms.199 Included in this list was the ability to proscribe
convicted felons from possessing firearms.200 Indeed, the Court’s
language in Heller mirrors that seen in the legislative history of SJR 39,
where legislators consistently avowed that the 1994 amendment would
not apply to felon-in-possession statutes.201
Lastly, even if one of the two preceding conditions had been met,
there is simply no legitimate argument that “more good than harm”
would come from overturning Gibson. Overturning Gibson would only
create a rash of challenges to the very laws that the Legislature
specifically noted it did not want to invalidate. By opening these
floodgates, the court would then be able to utilize strict scrutiny in a
manner directly adverse to the intent of both the Legislature and the
general public. This option simply cannot be viewed as a possibility that
would create “more good than harm.”

CONCLUSION
It would have been easier for the courts if the Alaska Legislature
had adopted a proposal that clearly stated the intended level of judicial
review and any categorical exceptions to article I, section 19. This way,

197. ALASKA, DIV. OF ELECTIONS, supra note 141.
198. See supra note 146.
199. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 625–27 (2008); see also id. at
627 n.26 (stating “our list does not purport to be exhaustive”); cf. Brannon P.
Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Heller, High Water(mark)? Lower Courts and the
New Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 60 HASTINGS L. J. 1245, 1248 (2009) (explaining
the “Heller safe harbor” and the categories the Court specifically mentioned as
unaffected by their decision).
200. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626.
201. See, e.g., S. JOURNAL, supra note 67, at 3034.
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the courts would have been assured that the general public was voting
based on both the individual right and the standard of review.
However, the main concern of Alaskans—and accordingly the main
concern of the Alaska Legislature—in 1994 was to enact an amendment
quickly that would cement article I, section 19 as guaranteeing an
individual right to keep and bear arms. After weighing all of their
options, legislators made a decision that the most likely way to achieve
this end was to add one sentence clearly and specifically stating that
there was an individual right for the citizens of Alaska to bear arms.
Legislators drafted their language accordingly, and the amendment
passed.
The recurring theme throughout the legislative history concerning
the amendment was the need to clarify that article I, section 19 protected
an individual right. The secondary issue regarding standard of review
has also now come to an appropriate result. The legislators who
commented on SJR 39 consistently noted that felon-in-possession
statutes should not be affected by the amendment. This straightforward
intent could not reliably be effected if strict scrutiny applied to
challenges under section 11.61.200(a)(1) of the Alaska Statutes. The
judicial and legislative branches do not always take the same path in
their decision-making. And indeed, they often have disagreements over
multiple aspects of the other’s performance.202 In Wilson, though, the
majority reached a conclusion that matched the legislative history by
refusing to apply strict scrutiny to Alaska’s felon-in-possession statutes.

202. See, e.g., MINUTES OF THE H. JUDICIARY COMM., supra note 116, at no. 129
(statement of Representative Phillips) (expressing distrust of the judicial branch
and incredulity at some of its rulings).

